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ABSTRACT 
RAMETTA, MATTHEW C. Controversies in Industrial Policy: The Creation of an 
Explicit U.S Industrial Policy, March 2017 
 
As the world continues to globalize, the United States will need to adapt in its 
industrial policy programs in order to stay competitive. As of today, the United States has 
no explicit programs to bolster particular industries to increase their performance, but 
rather does so implicitly through Department of Defense innovations that spill over into 
the private sector. However, we have seen such explicit policies in countries such as 
South Korea and China. There has been immense growth in the sectors that have been 
targeted by these programs, and this has raised questions about if the United States 
should adopt an explicit industrial policy. This thesis uses previous research on clusters, a 
new classification for Economic Areas, to inform the development of a U.S tailored 
industrial policy. This thesis proposes an explicit U.S industrial policy that targets 
clusters, geographic regions that include multiple related industries, and the results are 
promising. By using current DOD spending (a measure of U.S industrial policy 
expenditure), patent registrations as a measure of innovation, R&D expenditure, and 
value added, an accurate picture of what such a policy would do can be extrapolated. This 
thesis lays the groundwork for future research into this proposal, because as more data 
become available, statistical analyses will become more robust. If the U.S could 
capitalize on a program such as the one proposed in this thesis, there could be potential 
gains in employment, industry growth, and innovation. In addition, the U.S could see 
decreased income inequality if such a program is employed.
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A. Background Information 
In the last 30 years, trade barriers have fallen dramatically through increased 
international cooperation. This, and the emergence of multinational commercial 
juggernauts have spurred a new paradigm shift in international economics. As a result of 
these changes, however, the question of how to remain competitive in this landscape has 
arisen in many countries like the United States. For decades, countries such as South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have surged in economic growth and innovation due to strong 
industrial policy programs supported by the government. In its essence, industrial policy 
serves as a tool used by governments to address market failures in order to help 
strengthen domestic industry. Some examples of industrial policy range from tax breaks 
for specific firms/industries, import controls, etc, and many countries that have employed 
these policies have seen great success with such policy. China, for example, has seen 
dramatic export growth in its solar panels sector due to targeted policies such as tax 
breaks for solar cell firms. In a world where many countries are reaping the benefits of 
such policy, the U.S has opted not to follow direct industrial policy. The U.S implicitly 
does it through the Department of Defense, since certain innovations are made which 
then spillover to the private sector. While ultimately these spillovers can have some of 




B. Core Thesis Question 
The core question of this thesis is, “if a more efficient form of industrial policy for 
the United States exists, what would such a policy structure look like and what would its 
effects be on the economy?” Many scholars agree that industrial policy is an effective 
tool for creating domestic growth, and this thesis follow a similar sentiment. However, 
the initial hypothesis is that with a policy model targeting economic clusters rather than 
industries or firms, there will be a positive relationship between the strength of clusters 
and governmental spending, with innovation in the United States. In addition, this thesis 
hypothesizes such a model will be more efficient than the current indirect DOD industrial 
policy. 
C. Implications  
 Conclusions from this thesis could have some far reaching and important 
implications for economic policy going forward. The U.S appears to be in a situation 
currently with low inflation and middling growth overall, and the policy suggestions 
arising from this thesis could provide a direction for the U.S to go in hopes of spurring 
real long term growth. This thesis has implications for how the U.S could grow in terms 
of value added, employment, and innovation. 
This thesis proposes a fundamentally different type of industrial policy (one that 
targets clusters rather than firms or industries), which could open up new doors for 
growth. As discussed later in the thesis, clusters work through capitalizing on external 
economies, and therefore investment in those areas could be more efficient than targeting 
firms or industries. In addition, such a policy could increase employment by getting 
	 7	
funding to areas that don’t usually receive it. The more successful a particular cluster 
becomes, the more employees they will need.  
These policies may also have some positive side effects by implicitly addressing 
income inequality. As it stands now, the U.S is one of the worst countries in the 
developed world when it comes to income inequality, but in a policy proposal using 
economic clusters, there are multiple interconnected industries within a single cluster. 
Therefore, more demographic areas are the targets of industrial policy and therefore may 
spread job stimulus to more than just one particular industry. 
D. Thesis Structure 
 This thesis will be divided up into four other distinct Chapters (not including this 
chapter). Chapters two, three, and four are the core components of this thesis, with 
chapter five being the conclusion of the findings. Chapter two deals with the previous 
literature on the topic of industrial policy, and will discuss a wide range of scholars. 
Some scholars propose differing proposals for the optimal industrial policy, but none 
truly discuss the unique U.S case directly, and what should be done there. Chapter three 
focuses on analyzing the proposed model of industrial policy, and the rationale for each 
variable is dissected carefully. For example, Chapter three also discusses the rationale for 
the “three industry” mode of analysis that this thesis employs (choosing to sample three 
core industries for the analysis), and why each is included. Chapter four details the data 
in greater depth, and then proceeds to exhibit the empirical findings. Regression analysis 
and graphing data will be used in this thesis as the primary sources of evidence. Finally, 
Chapter four will interpret the results of the empirical data and apply those results to the 





 In order to have a complete understanding of the complexities of industrial policy 
and its variability in different countries, an accurate depiction of the existing research 
must be detailed. This thesis seeks to answer two core questions: does governmental 
industrial policy provide a net societal benefit, and, if so, should the proper model for its 
use be the Chinese model of direct intervention, or the U.S model of indirect, 
unintentional spillovers from defense department research? Currently, the United States 
does not have any kind of official industrial policy while some other countries have 
explicit governmental programs in place. With this in mind, the optimal industrial policy 
structure in the U.S case will be analyzed. In every one of the following pieces of 
literature a point of view that adds to the overall picture of the ongoing debate will be 
produced. On both sides, the data used varies from specific trade data (down to specific 
goods/parts of goods), to cluster data regarding the external economies of scale and their 
specific impact on growth. 
A. The Theoretical Background 
In order to fully understand the relevant literature set forth in this thesis, the 
theoretical framework revolving around industrial policy must be analyzed. The core 
economic theory that revolves around this thesis is market failure. Market failure is 
defined as a situation in which there is an inefficient allocation of goods and services in a 
given industry, firm, or country. As a result of these market failures, we see the 
development of externalities, which can be either positive or negative. In the case of 
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industrial policy, there are positive and negative externalities associated with market 
failure. Examples of these are found throughout the previous literature that this thesis 
explores. The theoretical justification for industrial policy, however, is that through 
governmental intervention (through subsidy etc.),  the government can capitalize on 
positive externalities and help level the playing field for the negative ones. In addition, 
the concept of external economies is closely related to this thesis. External economies 
develop in situations where you have closely grouped firms in a similar industry, such as 
we see in Hollywood or Silicon Valley. Because these firms are grouped close together, 
there are benefits that help lower their costs such as intellectual spillover, resource 
sharing, etc. As we see later in the thesis, the concept of external economies becomes 
pivotal in the proposed U.S industrial policy model.  
 Despite the theoretical arguments for why industrial policy works, there are also 
some conceptual arguments that allude to some drawbacks of industrial policy. For 
example, there is a risk of experiencing diminishing returns to scale from investment by 
government. As we will see later on, Michael Porter discusses the risk of the theoretical 
“convergence effects” where industrial policy on a the industry/firm level leads to 
decreasing output from investment.  
B. Context to the Chinese Case 
Industrial policy has a massive impact on the prices of goods on the international 
market, because the goal is that by providing governmental support to a domestic 
industry, firms will be able to lower costs and export more goods more cheaply. This has 
been the case in China specifically, which has served as a good example of direct 
governmental intervention in specific industries it wishes to bolster. The most obvious 
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example of this has been in China’s solar panel industry. Since 1977, the price of solar 
cells has fallen from $76.67/watt all the way down to $0.49/watt in 2016. This dramatic 
decrease is in no small part due to the industrial policy employed by China, which Groba 
and Cao discuss extensively. For the past 15 years, China has steadily been introducing 
new policy that would help the solar sector. For example, in 2001/2003 the Chinese 
Government passed legislation that implemented reduced value added taxation for 
renewable energy such as solar panels. Since then, “Chinese solar PV exports have 
increased by a factor of 26, reaching approximately USD 32 billion in 2010” (2015, p 
248) Groba and Cao use a Gravity Model for their empirical research to determine what 
the impact governmental policies had on R&D growth and export growth. They use 
“energy generated” from solar panels in China to determine “a high demand of, and thus 
a large market for” alternative energy. (2015 pp 256-258) They find that, when 
controlling for dummy variables meant to indicate when policy programs that include tax 
breaks, financial stimulus, etc went into effect, there was clear positive relationship 
between such policies and export growth. 
C. Proponents of Industrial Policy 
Some scholars have outlined significant economic and empirical justification for 
governmental support. For example, Doh and Kim (2014) make the case for government 
financial support programs by using the example of South Korea. South Korea has 
become an economic juggernaut in the last 40 years. Its GDP per capita has gone from 
roughly $875 in 1976 to almost $30,000 in 2016. This growth is in no small part due to 
their aggressive industrial policy model. In the early 1960’s South Korea outlined a plan 
for labor-intensive manufacturing job support, and for rapid technological growth. Since 
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then, they have had growth in job creation, company operating profit, and total revenue 
by many South Korean companies, especially ICT firms. In setting up their analysis, Doh 
and Kim note that specific examples of government strategy for inducing growth has 
been, public investment in regional industries, and more specifically financial support for 
technological growth. They propose that particularly in Small-Medium Enterprises, there 
is a problem due to crowding out by larger corporations. This, they hypothesize is where 
governmental investment can come into play. The financial investment into these smaller 
industries can help them overcome some of the pressures from larger players (in 
particular it allows them to obtain the resources they need) in order to innovate either 
with a breakthrough or “incremental innovation.”(2014,  9-10) In particular, they look at 
the Korean “Technology Development Assistance Fund” or TDAF, in order to gauge the 
growth in financial assistance in this sector. With this data (along with other variables 
such as firm age, firm size, R&D expenditures, and patent filings), they continued to run 
regression analysis and determined a number of correlations. For example, one revelation 
from this study was that expenditures from the TDAF are directly correlated with new 
patent/design registrations in small-medium firms. They also found that resource levels 
are positively correlated with R&D expenditures, which thereby implies that 
governmental support can have a profound impact on the ability for firms to spend more 
on innovating. (2014, 17)  Kim and Doh provide a concrete case study of a country’s use of 
industrial policy (specifically financial investment into technology) to boost firm’s ability 
to innovate. 
Another scholar who advocates for government strengthening of the private sector is 
Montero (2001). He uses the case of Brazil in order to describe what he believes to be a 
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successful use of industrial policy. Montero’s model revolves around “horizontal 
embededness” which he argues is essential to the success of such industrial policy 
because it involves the government getting involved with private entities on a “close, 
consultative” (2001, p 52) level. The reason he says this works is because it broadens the 
role of the government from that of a financier to more of a co-developer in many cases. 
This, he argues, can help prevent a lot of the hitches that occur in the 
innovation/production process by sounding off “alarm bells” when progression goals are 
not being satisfied. In the case of Minas Gerais, Brazil, the technological development of 
the region was unprecedented under the policy that Montero argues for. In this case, the 
government would set up small agencies in localities where there could be direct 
involvement with industry. Not only would there be financial support, but there would 
also be “official planning by national and subnational firms and agencies” (Montero, 
2001, pp 56) For example, in 1972 the government sponsored “company of industrial 
districts”(CDI) was formed, and it provided logistical, financial, and political support for 
rising firms in its given region. The result of this, Montero asserts, can be seen best in the 
automotive sector (specifically the Fiat brand) in Minas Gerais. With the cooperative help 
of the CDI, which gave land and infrastructure to the industry while also providing 
political support, and state government, which gave immense amounts of capital to the 
auto industry. Without such government support, the auto industry in this area would 
have never been able to compete with other, larger firms that were already established. 
However, with such industrial policy, Fiat production in the region went from 26% in 
1989 to 44.3% in 1995. (2001, pp 66)  Government, he asserts, has increasingly been 
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taking on less conventional roles in terms of industrial policy, and that under the 
“horizontal embededness” model there should be significant gains to innovation output. 
One of the strongest positions on this issue comes from Wade (2016). His primary 
thesis revolves around both proving the existence of something called the “Middle 
Income Trap”(MIT) in which countries are stuck in low-middle income but cannot break 
through to what would be considered “high income” due to “forces analogous to gravity” 
(2016, pp 25-26) such as internal forces (poor institutions/rule of law) and external 
(orientation within international trade). He goes even further than this and argues that not 
only is industrial policy helpful, but it is a necessary condition for escaping the middle-
income trap. In support of his argument, Wade notes that in 2014, a World Bank study 
concluded that 101 countries were considered middle income, but only 13 could be 
considered high income. Wade acknowledges that the actual mechanism by which the 
MIT occurs is hard to identify, but some have suggested poor governance or poor 
education institutions. (2016, pp 26-27)  However, wade’s contribution lies in his 
empirical analysis of the MIT mechanism, and how export structure data can provide 
clues as to what causes this trap (which then helps explain how to get out of it). He finds 
that “per capita income is positively correlated with more diversified production 
structure.” He also finds that on the international level, multinational firms tend not to 
create “global” production chains, thus sticking with a few of their trusted suppliers in a 
few countries which makes it hard for these low-middle income countries to enter the 
market.  
 After Wade has identified the causes of the middle income trap, he is safely able 
to propose the solution to the problem; strong industrial policy. He argues that the 
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decision to engage in industrial policy boils down to one conditional statement “1) the 
market fails (the necessary condition), and (2) the costs caused by the intervention are 
less than the costs of leaving the market failure unattended (the sufficient condition)” 
(2016, pp 33-35). This falls in line with the theoretical framework discussed earlier, 
because the market failed, thus causing the imbalance leading to the middle income trap, 
but then industrial policy can be employed in order to counteract negative externalities 
created by the market failure (provided that the costs of fixing it are less than leaving the 
market failure alone). Wade criticizes those scholars who say that the government role 
should simply be to “lead” industry in the right direction, because he says that is a very 
narrow and limited use of industrial policy. Wade contends that these middle-income 
countries experience market failures, and that industrial policy must be used to capitalize 
even further than is usually expected under the usual comparative advantage model. He 
says that simply leading countries with industrial policy simply is “stretching”(Wade 
pp35) comparative advantage rather than breaking free of it completely and going far 
beyond it. He provides examples of this through Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea post 
WWII where they experienced changes in comparative advantage far outside the bounds 
that it could be “stretched” to. 
D. Theories on Optimal Industrial Policy 
Spence (1984) explains a few key policy proposals that could increase domestic 
industry competitiveness. His ideas are the basis for a lot of the general consensus in 
international economics regarding proactive trade policy. In his article, he begins by 
discussing the relative market share disadvantage in certain industries and how that can 
lead to “cost disadvantages.” For example, in R&D based industries, costs to achieve a 
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certain level of innovation are usually fixed. However, there is a “premium” placed on 
getting into prime markets that would help pay off the R&D costs, so that forms a cost 
disadvantage for smaller industries trying to enter an oligopolistic market (1984, pp356-
357).  In order to counter this, one policy proposal Spence suggests is “blocking of access 
to a market,” which is a protectionist policy that involves making it easier for domestic 
competitors to enter the market. For example, if a multinational pharmaceutical firm 
wanted to sell goods in the U.S but there was a U.S pharmaceutical firm that wanted to 
break through to the international market, the U.S impose something like import controls 
to make it easier for the U.S firm to be more competitive. Another policy tool he 
discusses is government subsidies for specific industries. Spence argues that “subsidies as 
‘competitive’ weapons are not really of interest because they simply tip the balance in the 
(price) equilibrium in such a way that increases net benefits to the subsidizer”(1984, pp 
359). However, he says that subsidies can have a use when the desired effect is to expand 
the number of competitors in an industry. Subsidies in this case would lower the costs for 
the country’s firms that are trying to break through, and therefore would make it easier 
for competitors to grow. 
Porter (2012) is an outspoken proponent of industrial policy, and he argues for 
something called the clusters mechanism in industrial policy. The core premise behind 
the clusters argument is based around the principle of external economies. As discussed 
earlier, external economies are when there are groups of firms located in close geographic 
regions, that they experience falling marginal costs, spillovers, etc (similar to how a large 
firm would but that would be internal economies of scale). The theoretical framework 
does support the contention that Porter’s cluster argument is valid, because in the U.S 
	 16	
Clusters are already an area of falling marginal costs and increased productivity, so it 
makes sense to target these areas for industrial policy (at least from simply a theoretical 
viewpoint). Porter argues that such a concept can be used to identify regional “clusters” 
throughout the United States that are linked with high economic performance measured 
in employment (Porter et al., 2012, pp 4-6). For example, Hollywood moviemaking 
would be a cluster that experiences external economies of scale, but Porter argues that 
you can go even deeper to the “industry-region” level, because they experience clustering 
as well. In the analysis, their “findings thus suggest that the positive impact of clusters on 
employment growth does not come at the expense of wages, investment, or innovation.” 
In addition, Porter et al. find evidence of innovation growth within these clusters as 
measured by patent growth (Porter et al, 2012, pp 6-7). In Porter’s model, he identifies 
employment growth as the key left side variable, and a number of right side variables 
measuring cluster strength and specialization. It is also important to note that Porter uses 
percentage changes in his model (logs both sides). He also includes a measure of industry 
specialization to see how employment is impacted on this micro level. Industries within a 
region are considered to be a size below the clusters that Porter refers to, and these can be 
subject to convergence effects, which lower employment growth due to diminishing 
returns to specialization. This variable is measured in the “location quotient” which 
indicates how “overrepresented” the area’s employment in a specific industry is. Cluster 
strength and specialization are measured using an “employment based location quotient” 
which measures how concentrated employment is in that industry within that region 
(Porter et al, 2012, pp. 20-21). After controlling for a number of Economic Area fixed 
effects, they find that the most substantial employment growth is found at those data 
	 17	
points where there is low industry level specialization but high cluster specialization. 
This means that “regional	industries	that	are	located	in	relatively	strong	clusters	experience	much	higher	growth	rates	in	employment,”	(Porter	et	al,	2012,	pp.	25).	In	addition,	Porter	finds	a	strong,	systematic,	and	positive	correlation	between	cluster	strength	and	wage/patent	growth	rates.	Overall,	Porter	concludes	that	there	should	not	be	a	distinction	between	“industry	specialization	and	regional	diversity,”	because	as	he	finds,	although	industries	that	are	highly	specialized	and	not	near	similar	economic	areas	(clusters)	will	see	diminishing	returns,	industries	that	are	in	clusters	with	“complementary	activity”	will	see	strong	growth	in	wages,	innovation,	and	employment	(Porter	et	al,	2012,	pp	34).	This	research	is	the	foundation	on	which	Porter’s	paper	on	industrial	policy	is	built,	because	he	uses	cluster	theory	to	inform	his	assertions	on	actual	policy.		 Porter’s discussion of how best to go about industrial policy revolves around his 
conclusions regarding clusters and economic performance. He asserts that “since clusters 
involve powerful externalities across firms in a location, and associated public goods, 
there is a strong rationale for public policy,” (Porter, 2007, pp. 5).  He establishes that 
clusters are linked with high economic performance, and he urges governments to 
capitalize on these clusters. In laying out the context of his argument, he again says that 
dealing with policy at the cluster level avoids many of the inefficiencies that go along 
with policy at the industry/firm level. However, the core philosophy regarding Porter’s 
suggestions is that he believes such policy should not discriminate on which clusters to 
support. He contends that,  “cluster policy is thus fundamentally different from sectoral 
or industrial policy, whose fatal flaw is their focus on favoring particular types of 
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economic activity, picking winners, and attempting to artificially bias competition in 
favor of a particular country or region,”(Porter, 2007, pp 6). As a result of this 
philosophy, Porter lays out how exactly he builds a framework of his version of industrial 
policy (which he calls “Cluster-based policies”). He argues that good policy will avoid 
industry/firm oriented programs, use Clusters as a tool to integrate economic policy (they 
are inherently organized, and therefore can help guide policy in such a way), focus 
federal stimulus around clusters (whether it be financial or otherwise), and set up an 
incentives system for the private sector to begin investment in such clusters. With these 
general ideas, he has some specific suggestions for how to support such clusters. For 
example, he suggests that governments actually formalize the clusters themselves as 
actual regions so that targeted investment will be made easier. In addition, Porter 
advocates for “Cluster Planning Grants,” in which the designated clusters would compete 
for funding, thus increasing the likelihood of innovation through competition. Michael 
Porter’s idea is based on the U.S case, which makes his analysis incredibly valuable for 
this thesis. His cluster framework will be employed in order to accurately capture what 
the best U.S case of industrial policy is. 
 The supposed “underinvestment” in R&D and innovation by the private sector is 
viewed as strong justification for the public sector to supplement these areas. In the 
United States, is no explicit industrial policy in place, and so it could be argued that there 
is currently “underinvestment” in the key industries that could be producing more 
innovation with the proper resources. Tassey (2005) advocates for a better way of 
determining not only whether or not there is underinvestment in industrial R&D, but also 
a way to find an “optimal” level of investment to provide a net economic benefit for the 
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society. His three stage approach is as follows, “(1) identify and explain the causes of the 
underinvestment, (2) characterize and assess the investment trends and their impacts, and 
(3) estimate the magnitude of the underinvestment relative to a perceived optimum in 
terms of its cost to the economy.” Tassey explains that private investors often cannot 
provide enough investment to get innovative R&D projects off the ground because of 
“market risk and return” factors. (Tassey, 2005, pp. 94) Some of these risks are the 
technical complexity of the project, timing, and spillovers/economies of scale. The 
technical complexity in particular can be a serious hurdle for investors because, 
especially in the early stages of research, the costs are high and the research requires 
“multidisciplinary research teams and unique research facilities that do not exist.” 
(Tassey, 2005, pp 95) Tassey also seems to agree with Porter’s reservations about 
specialization for industries/firms by saying that it “accentuates path dependence” and 
forces them to stick to generic, safe innovation plans that are more likely to guarantee 
revenue. This is precisely where the security of governmental support could give the push 
needed to explore more innovative options. Tassey’s model for estimating the optimal 
level of investment in a given industry uses two core variables called Private Rate of 
Return (PRR) and the Hurdle Rate (HR). An investment will likely not receive high 
private sector funding if its PRR is below its HR because the investment is too risky to 
become worthwhile. (Tassey, 2005, pp 100) Also, Tassey’s model suggests that there is 
also a variable called Social Rate of Return (SRR). Something that has a high SRR would 
be something that has a high public good, such as infrastructure or basic research. 
However, just because something has a high SRR does not mean that it will have a high 
PRR, and oftentimes PRR wouldn’t be close enough to the HR to substantially justify 
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private investment in goods that cause high social benefit. This is where he argues 
government comes in. Tassey asserts that projects such as basic research are prime 
“candidate(s) for government financial assistance, usually in the form of cost- shared 
funding for the conduct of generic technology research. Cost sharing reduces risk enough 
to stimulate initial private investment in applied R&D.” (Tassey, 2005, pp 100) However, 
Tassey does not believe that governmental support is the final answer. He believes that 
ultimately, as a government is able to get PRR over HR in an industry, that subsidies can 
be “phased out” and private investment will be stimulated enough to continue to 
innovate. (Tassey, 2005, pp 105) Tassey also notes that government investment is an 
imperfect mechanism because each dollar spent does is not 100% efficient in creating 
innovation. For example, he cites the fact that “the Department of Defense spent $570 
million on research between 1987 and 1995,” but despite this investment, “the overall 
market had not reached $1 billion in annual sales by 1996.” (Tassey 2005, pp. 108) In his 
conclusion, Tassey cites the importance of his three stages again, because with their use 
industrial policy will be significantly more effective for finding the optimal level of 
investment.   
E. Skeptics of Industrial Policy 
Although they are few in number, there are those scholars who are a bit more skeptical of 
the benefits from industrial policy. The core idea behind industrial policy is to provide 
net utility to the country that is attempting to do it, but there are a few who suggest more 
modest policy due to the fact that there may be more consequences than previously 
imagined. Baldwin and Krugman (1988) argue that there are some hidden consequences 
to industrial policy, and they use the context of the wide-bodied jet aircraft industry as a 
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context for their analysis. In particular, they create a model revolving around two of 
Airbus and Boeings competing models; the A300 and the 767. In this case, Boeing was 
the established giant in this industry, and a European consortium “subsidized ” Airbus’s 
production. The European governments that supported Airbus denied claims that they 
were using subsidies since they expected to be paid back in full contingent on Airbus 
making a profit. (Krugman et al, 1988, pp 46). Regardless of the semantics, Krugman 
argues that this subsidy allowed Airbus to enter the industry by lowering production 
costs. This entrance lowered the global price for wide-bodied aircraft, but Krugman 
argues that there were some troubling welfare effects that must be taken into account 
when looking at the effects of the subsidy. The United States is obviously hurt from the 
increased competition on the world market, but he uses a model centered around allowing 
for  “intertemporal demand subsitution” (net effect on consumption from changes in new 
competition) to get more precise measurements. Krugman finds that the U.S actually 
received a net loss of $3 billion from Airbus entering the industry. However, he finally 
concludes that, ultimately, whether or not the subsidy was worth it depends on the 
discount rate of Europe. With this in mind, however, he notes that in order for the subsidy 
to be worth the investment, Europe would need a discount rate of 3% or below. He argues 
that “On net, Europe loses (except for the low 3 percent discount rate), the United States 
loses, and the rest of the world gains.” (Krugman et al, 1988, pp 69) Therefore, he is 
unsure whether or not such policy is worthwhile because it depends on what a country’s 
discount rate is (this is extremely hard to determine). However, if the discount rate were 
high, the losses in the Airbus case would’ve been astronomical (up to $9 billion). 
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(Krugman et al, 1988) Although Krugman does not give an outward rejection of 
industrial policy, he is skeptical and is simply more cautious about certain uses of it. 
 
F. Conclusion 
As the world becomes more globalized, some countries are trying to find ways of 
remaining competitive. Production chains are becoming more fragmented, and 
increasingly countries in the low-middle income bracket are finding it hard to break 
through into the global production chain. The world has established players whose costs 
are lowered from scale economies, and for a given country trying to enter, it can be hard 
to compete. However, even for larger countries like the U.S, the desire to capitalize on 
market failures has proved difficult given that they do not currently participate in any 
kind of explicit industrial policy. As of right now, the U.S DOD employs implicit 
industrial policy, in which spillovers from the DOD spur innovation for the private 
sector. However, the optimal U.S industrial policy could be derived by using a model that 
employs the “cluster” level that Michael Porter advocates for. Policy that targets the 
cluster level is much more likely to be successful since it does not encounter the same 
convergence effects seen at the industry/firm level, which makes it a very strong starting 
point. Beyond this, numerous authors have offered their opinions on the best way to 
conduct industrial policy ranging from “horizontal embededness” as cited by Montero, to 
Wade who argues that comparative advantage needs to be broken through completely. 
Another key contribution for this thesis is that by Doh & Kim, which emphasizes the 
importance of using patent registration (a surrogate for innovation) as the goal of 
industrial policy. 
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 The relevant literature provides a good framework to begin the construction of a 
strong industrial policy tailored to the United States. The United States is unique in that it 
is a net importer (whereas most of the countries currently employing aggressive industrial 
policy are net exporters), but it is also one of the worlds leading global economies. It also 
has one of the most disparate income distributions in the entire developed world, and 
therefore requires a solution that will ensure more areas of the economy are impacted 
than just a handful of targeted industries.  
G. Methodology 
This thesis seeks to determine the optimal U.S industrial policy, which is a difficult 
task given that the U.S currently does not have any such explicit industrial policy. The 
definition of “optimal” in this case is in regards to the industrial policy that is the most 
efficient in addressing the market failures present in the U.S economy. The justification 
for enacting such a policy could be the potential growth in GDP, increased exports, less 
income inequality, and greater domestic employment. Chapter 3 will explore the 











ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL 
 
 In this chapter, there will be a comprehensive analysis of the model that 
will be used to determine the optimal U.S industrial policy. However, there is an 
initial challenge to determine what model would best fit the United States, given 
that there is no such explicit policy currently in place. This thesis will justify the 
model, however, by breaking down the rationale for each included variable, while 
also providing informational context for that variable. Section A will discuss the 
important things that the model must do in order to be viable, while each 
succeeding section will discuss individual variables and their historical context, 
data sources, and the rationale for it’s inclusion.  
A. What an Optimal Model Must Do  
In order to have an acceptable model for a new U.S industrial policy, there 
are a few things that it must include. The goal of the model is to ultimately create a 
form of industrial policy that is more efficient than the current U.S method 
involving the DOD expenditures, so that is the underlying philosophy that must 
inform every aspect of the model. As this thesis determined earlier in the 
discussions revolving around Porter, targeting clusters for industrial policy appears 
to be the optimal starting point for the U.S case. Using clusters seems optimal for the 
U.S (as exhibited by Porter) and if used in a more explicit U.S industrial policy, it could 
strengthen multiple industries at the same time because of external economies (which 
	 25	
could help with income inequality). There may be a concern that using clusters along 
with “industry level” data may cause some conflict for statistical analysis. However, 
clusters are simply geographic areas of related industries, which means that other 
variables, such as innovation and investment, will be able to stay at the industry level 
while still using clusters in the model. 
This model must also have a clear variable for governmental input. The nature of 
industrial policy is that the government invests through some means (grants, contracts, 
etc) and then they expect to get some kind of gain out of their investment. In addition, 
there also obviously must be a measure with output that matches up with the input. This 
would be the left side variable in our model, and would go up or down depending on a 
change in governmental input. An example of this kind of output would be innovation, 
because if the government were funding a certain area, they would like to see more 
innovation as a result. 
B. Current U.S Industrial Policy 
 Unlike other countries such as China or South Korea, the U.S does not outwardly 
attempt to bolster domestic industry though industrial policy. Instead, there is a more 
implicit version in which organizations such as the Department of Defense spend money 
on certain sectors in order to innovate for military use. This can, however, create some 
innovation in the private sector, because the creation of a core technology by the DOD 
could result in spillovers to the private sector. For example, Epinephrine, a universally 
used emergency medication for people with severe allergies, was actually created by the 
DOD for military use. Originally, it was made to allow soldiers to survive a chemical 
attack (Reinmann, 2016). However, over time there was a spillover into the private 
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sector, and Myelin then created the Epi-Pen, which could be used for a severe allergic 
reaction.  
 While this type of industrial policy has been going on for years, other countries 
have been thriving and seeing massive expansion 
due to a more explicit approach. 
Therefore, it could be that the DOD 
approach is not the most efficient 
way, so this thesis will propose a new 
model using clusters, current U.S 
DOD expenditure in particular 
industries, and innovation as 
measured by new patent registration. As seen in Figure 1, the U.S defense spending has 
largely been a steady (if slightly declining) portion of GDP since World War II, and since 
the U.S currently has no dedicated program to industrial policy it stands to reason that 
less money is going towards the growth of private industry. The model for this thesis is 
below. Each individual variable will be discussed in depth later in the thesis.  
Pit= Bi +Bt+B1CSit+B2Iit+B3RDit+B4VAit ai+ar 
Where Pit is patent registration by industry over time, Bi is a fixed effect for industry, 
and Bt is the fixed effect for time. CSit indicates the specialization levels (strength) of a 
cluster (in an industry over time), and Iit indicates the level of investment in a given 
industry over time. RDit and VAit are the control variables “research and development 
spending” and “Value Added.” 
Figure	1	
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Despite the fact that the U.S does not engage in explicit industrial policy, this thesis 
proposes an innovative way of estimating the impact of using a cluster-based policy.  
 It its essence, the core relationship in this thesis is one of inputs and outputs. 
Inputs would be considered investment (or potentially other forms of support) by a 
government under industrial policy, and output would be what the government would like 
to get out of its investment (in this case, innovation). Luckily, truly explicit industrial 
policy is not needed in order to estimate this relationship because we only need to know 
the relative effect on innovation from a given amount of investment. For example, if one 
looks at the current U.S DOD spending in pharmaceutical research (its likely for military 
use), and also observed that there was also innovation growth in the private 
pharmaceutical sector, then we can extrapolate those results to inform the usefulness of 
more direct industrial policy. Essentially, since there is currently no explicit industrial 
policy in the U.S, as long as we see that a relationship exists between investments an 
innovation, it would be sensible to assume that the same relationship would exist in a 
hypothetical explicit form of industrial policy. 
 With all of this information in mind, a coherent framework of analysis can be 
built. This thesis uses a model that takes into account the relationship between innovation 
and investment through the lens of clusters. The relativistic aspect to this analysis allows 
for an accurate way to devise industrial policy even when such a policy is not in existence 
yet. 
C. Data Set and Methodology 
 In order to capture the impact of investment and clusters on innovation, there is a 
very specific setup for the data set that must be used. The type of data that are used in this 
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thesis is panel data, which allows for both a time-series aspect, and a cross sectional 
aspect. This is crucial, because simply exhibiting the change in innovation over time 
when compared to the change in investment and cluster specialization over time misses 
the important cross sectional component to industrial policy. Not all industries in the 
United States are the same, and there may be differences in the resulting innovation from 
a given amount of government spending. Therefore, this thesis uses a sample of three 
different industries, Information Communication Technology (ICT), Biopharmaceuticals, 
and Aerospace Manufacturing. For each industry, there are data on patent registration, 
cluster specialization, and government spending over the period of 2007-2013. The fact 
that this thesis uses panel data was actually key in determining what data to use, because 
each database had to include both the same time range, and the same industry in order to 
stay consistent. 
D. Justification for Selection of Industries 
 An integral decision in this thesis was the selection of Biopharmaceuticals, ICT, 
and Aerospace manufacturing as the key industries that will be measured. The industries 
must each capture a portion of the U.S market that is significantly different than the 
other. At the same time, there must be enough industries to ensure that there is sufficient 
data for a regression analysis. Finally, each industry must also represent an area that the 
U.S conducts significant international trade. Since the purpose of this thesis is to find the 
optimal industrial policy (ultimately to make the U.S competitive in markets 
internationally), it stands to reason that the industries used in this analysis should be those 
that are currently robust trading sectors. This is in line with what other scholars have 
done in order to measure the impact of clusters. For example, Porter et al. (2012) elected 
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to use “traded industries” in contrast to local industries because of the fact that traded 
clusters “concentrate in particular regions but sell products or services across regions and 
countries.” This gives a far more accurate representation of U.S trade. For example, using 
the “Apparel” industry in the U.S would not be a strong industry for analysis because of 
the fact most apparel production is done outside the country. 
 ICT is a booming industry in the United States right now, and therefore it was one 
of the frontrunners for application in this thesis. ICT is a broad industry that encapsulates 
telecommunications via telephone lines, wireless networks, computers, and various other 
audio-visual networks. This industry also includes digital storage, software, and the 
integration of these services into consumer products. The United States currently ranks 
6th in the worldwide share of the ICT market (OECD, 2016), and according to the “ICT 
development index,” a benchmark of ICT performance across countries, the U.S only 
ranks 14th in the world (Information Technology Union, 2014). Other countries such as 
South Korea (ranked #1), have incorporated strong industrial policy, and there could be a 
connection between strong industrial policy and ICT performance. In the case of this 
study, ICT is a prime candidate for analysis because it is a highly connected/traded 
market, and would be one of the first targets of good industrial policy.  
 Biopharmaceuticals is another key industry in the United States, but also one that 
is highly traded. “Big Pharma” is a phrase that gets tossed around a lot today, but it 
accurately represents the size and scale of the U.S pharmaceutical industry. Many of the 
largest pharmaceutical companies in the world are U.S based (Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, 
etc), and the U.S has the largest Pharmaceutical industry by far with a value of roughly 
$3.5 Trillion. The closest competitor is Japan with a size of just $940 Billion, and clearly 
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it is a massive worldwide industry for the U.S (World Atlas, 2016). The 
biopharmaceutical industry will have no shortage of data, and would be representative of 
a distinctly different U.S market than ICT. Also, given that the Biopharmaceutical 
industry is very heavily R&D based, strong industrial policy would be extremely helpful 
in reducing the costs of research, thus allowing for greater innovation/product creation. 
 Finally, the U.S Aerospace industry was selected because of its large size on an 
international scale, the fact that it is sufficiently distinct from both 
ICT/biopharmaceuticals, and also its unique market structure (its very much an oligopoly 
worldwide). In the U.S, the aerospace market includes both commercial and military 
aircraft, along with spacecraft manufacturing/development. The U.S Aerospace Sector 
contributed $144.1 Billion in export sales in 2015 alone, and provides 500,000 jobs in 
direct scientific/technical work along with 700,000 related jobs (USA Investment 
Summit, 2015). Big manufacturers such as Boeing and Lockheed Martin dominate the 
Aerospace market, and although there are currently large government contracts in the 
military/spacecraft areas, there is not much government investment in other areas such as 
civilian aircraft manufacturing/R&D. The Aerospace sector in particular provides a 
unique market structure (an oligopoly), and this will provide the variety in the data set is 
needed for a strong empirical analysis.  
The ICT, Biopharmaceuticals, and Aerospace industries provide strong variation, 
size, and potential for investment through an optimal U.S industrial policy. Therefore, 
these three industries will be used in the data set, and each will have a set of variables, 
(innovation, cluster strength, and government investment) along with a set of years to 
complete the panel data set. 
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E. Measuring Innovation (Pit) 
 Measuring the output from industrial policy can be difficult because there are a 
number of different ways to do it. One could look at company revenue growth in dollars, 
or value added, etc. However, this thesis will measure output through innovation in a 
given industry, because innovation is one of the core drivers of growth. If an industry is 
experiencing a lot of growth in innovation, then we should expect that that industry 
would see greater economic growth. In order to measure innovation, patent registration in 
a given sector will be used. Patents are helpful because they are widely used as a measure 
of new ideas/innovation, so if you see that over time there are more patents in a given 
sector, then that industry has innovated more. When used in conjunction with cluster data 
and investment data, the potential relationship between investment in clusters and 
innovation could be observed. It should, however, be noted that there is a potential issue 
with the use of patents as a measure of output from industrial policy. This is the fact that 
patents are a real number, whereas other data in the model will primarily be used in 
dollar terms. If it were the case that using patents became problematic, value added 
would be a viable substitute since it is also in dollar terms. 
 The patent data needs to have both a time aspect, and an industry aspect. Since the 
data set this thesis uses is a panel data set  (three industries over time), the patent data 
will need to match up. By using the US Patent and Trademark office, these data are 
available by both the NAICS Code (classifies a patent by a certain economic 
activity/industry). NAICS has largely replaced the older version of industry classification, 
the SIC code, and therefore this will be the categorization standard this thesis will use. 
Within this database, the data goes back as far as 1964 and provides the number of 
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patents in that sector for a given year. For example, one sector that is used in this thesis is 
the Biopharmaceutical sector. Therefore, all the patents for a given set of years in the 
“Pharmaceutical and Medicine” industry (NAICS code: 3254) would be used in the data 
set. The same thing would be done for the remaining two industries. 
F. Justifying and Measuring Clusters  
 Clusters are the key differentiator from previous research for this thesis. Clusters, 
as Porter (2012) proposes in his works, are the optimal target for industrial policy 
because they take advantage of external economies. The inclusion of Clusters as the 
economic area of analysis is justified because of the fact that the U.S has shown to see 
more wage, innovation, and employment growth in clusters rather than industries or 
firms.  Measuring clusters, however, proves to be an immense challenge because they are 
a novel economic area without any accepted unit of measurement. Luckily, Porter and 
Harvard Business School have developed a way of understanding the 
strength/specialization of a given cluster.  In a database created by Harvard and the U.S 
Economic Development Administration, they created and defined the much sought after 
unit of measurement, the Location Quotient.  The Location Quotient is defined as the 
“Ratio of an industry's share of total state employment in a location relative to its share of 
total national employment. Measures the specialization or concentration of a cluster in a 
particular location relative to the national average, with an LQ > 1 indicating higher than 
average cluster concentration in a location.” (U.S Cluster Mapping Project, 2014) This 
means that the higher the LQ, the more specialized/concentrated a given sector is in that 
cluster.  
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 By using clusters in this model, it will be possible to discern whether or not a U.S 
industrial policy targeting particular geographic areas will yield the most innovation. 
Because of the benefit of external economies that we see in clusters, the U.S should get 
most “bang for its buck” by using clusters, meaning that a dollar investment (or R&D 
expenditure) will go further by targeting clusters rather than industries or firms. 
Theoretically, Porter has laid out why Clusters work for the United States, but they will 
need to be tested empirically before confirming their viability in the optimal U.S 
industrial policy. 
G. Measuring Governmental Input  
This thesis required a concrete measurement of U.S government expenditure (which 
is investment by nature) for an explicit industrial policy, but at the same time there is 
currently no such policy in existence.  However, as discussed previously, the U.S 
Department of Defense has been doing this implicitly for many years, and therefore it 
stands to reason that historical data from DOD expenditure in specific sectors could be 
used to extrapolate on to what an explicit policy would entail. There are few other ways 
to gauge the level of investment ongoing in the U.S for use in the private sector, and 
since we know that spillovers occur into the private sector from the DOD, this 
methodology appears to be sound. 
 Measuring investment through DOD spending in given sectors is a challenge, but 
it is made possible through government records. The use of the Department of Defense, 
however, even impacts the types of industries that are used in the analysis. For example, 
it would be reasonable for the DOD to invest in the Aerospace sector via contracts, but 
there would be very little reason for it to invest in the Agriculture sector. Therefore, each 
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industry used in this analysis had to be a theoretical fit for the DOD, otherwise the data 
would be skewed due to unrepresentative investment numbers. 
H. Control Variables Justification 
The use of research and development as a control variable is essential to ensuring that 
there is no omitted variable bias in the regression analysis. Levels of research and 
development in a given sector will obviously have an impact on the level of innovation 
(patents) in that sector. If there is more research and development spending, there will be 
more resources available for the creation of new ideas, products, and tools. The level of 
research and development spending in a given industry, therefore, can be reasonably 
assumed to have an impact on the level of innovation in a sector, and thus must be a 
control in the analysis. 
 Using value added as a control variable may be considered contentious at first, but 
upon closer analysis, it makes sense that the size of a given industry could impact the 
level of innovation. Although a lot of this thesis so far has discussed external economies 
as a key factor in predicting levels of innovation, there is also an “internal economies” 
aspect that must be controlled for. As is taught in Economics 101, the larger 
firms/industries get, the more spread out their fixed costs get. Lower costs can mean 
greater available resources for innovation, and thus there must be a control variable to 
represent this. Value added (by industry by year), is exactly the variable that does this, 
because it exhibits a particular industries size at the time. This variable would be 
controlling for the scenario where a larger industry is able to innovate more than a 
smaller one due to internal economies, and therefore it must be included as well. 
However, it is important to note that the core phenomenon occurring in a cluster based 
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industrial policy is external economies, value added is simply a control (unless using 
patents is problematic, in which case value added will become the dependent variable). 
I. Conclusion 
The model for the optimal U.S industrial policy needs to be able to best estimate the 
impact of investment (in a cluster economy) on innovation. By using patents for 
innovation, DOD spending for investment, and the Location Quotient for cluster 
specialization, the model will be as close as is possible (without actually employing 
explicit U.S industrial policy in the real world) to determining the optimal U.S policy. In 
the next chapter, the specific data that are used will be detailed further, regression 
analysis will be employed, and finally, the results will be presented and interpreted. 















DATA AND RESULTS 
 
 Now that the model has been dissected piece by piece to understand the rationale 
for each of its parts, a more in depth data analysis will be conducted in this chapter.  In 
addition, the framework for a regression analysis will be created, and then the results of 
the empirical work will be exhibited and interpreted. The goal of this section will be to 
say definitively if the optimal U.S industrial policy is one that targets clusters with 
governmental funding. The data that are used in this thesis will (units, sources, etc).  In 
order to do this, there will be multiple different avenues of statistical analysis including 
regressions and graphing.  
A. DOD Investment Data 
In order to accurately measure the real, current DOD expenditures in each of the three 
industries (ICT, Biopharmaceuticals, and Aerospace), the data needed to be annualized. 
Without an annualized measure of DOD expenditure, there would be no way to create the 
panel data set that was required for this thesis. Unfortunately, there was no readily 
available “pre-annualized” data set for DOD expenditure, but given the importance of the 
use of panel data, a new way to annualize the data needed to be constructed. To do this, 
the initial data were gathered from the USA spending database, which holds all of the 
current U.S investment data for all industries, all government agencies, and in multiple 
different forms (grants, contracts, etc). The spending data were presented on a 
transactional level, meaning that each individual contract, grant, etc is logged in this 
database. In a given industry, there were hundreds of thousands of transactions in the 
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time period given in the database, and the database did not provide the total spending in a 
year. This was seemingly problematic, but it was overcome due to data customization and 
some work in Microsoft excel. In particular, the data sets could be customized to include 
only the investment data for the particular industry, agency, and form of the users 
choosing. For example, in the case of the ICT sector, the search on the USA Spending 
database was narrowed down to only those investments made in the ICT sector. The ICT 
sector was identified through the NCAIS code, a unique industry identifier used for both 
patent and investment data. In addition, including only those investments made by the 
Department of Defense narrowed the data down even further. Finally, once the dataset 
included just DOD expenditure in the ICT industry, there were 8250 transactions from 
2007-2015 (the only available time frame for the database). In order to change the data 
set from the transactional format to the annual format, the sum all of the transactions 
within a given year was calculated, thus providing one annualized number for how much 
money the DOD spent on the ICT sector in one year. 
 This process was repeated for each of the other two industries, with roughly 7-10 
thousand transactions per industry that were then annualized for use in the panel data set. 
The unit of measurement for the DOD spending was originally just dollars, but in order to 
make the spending data match the other variables, the units were changed into millions of 
dollars in the data set. 
 
B. Cluster Data 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the unit of measurement for a given clusters strength 
and/or specialization is the Location Quotient. However, the process of readying this data 
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for regression was far more involved than simply plugging it into Eviews. These data 
were sourced from the U.S Cluster Mapping Project, which provides Location Quotient 
data in the form of a map or an excel file. In order to better visualize what this data looks 
like in practice, a map of the ICT sector is 
viewable in Figure 2. In this 
map, the areas that are 
shaded blue or turquoise are 
the ones with above average 
levels of specialization. For 
example, in the “Boise 
City” Cluster, which 
includes parts of Idaho and Oregon, the value of the location quotient is 4.01, which is 
significantly above average in the ICT sector. The data from this map, when downloaded 
to a Microsoft Excel file, has the LQ data for the year selected in every cluster shown.  
The issue with the cluster data was that there was no single LQ value for a given year, 
but rather there were 181. In order to preserve the measured change in LQ over time 
while still making the data useable in a panel data set, the median LQ value for all 
clusters in a given year was used as the singular value for that year. The use of the 
median is justified due to the fact that it would not be skewed by high LQ values as the 
mean is, and thus it would be a reliable indicator of a “typical” U.S cluster. In addition, 
this approach was necessitated by the fact that DOD expenditure data was not available 
by individual location, and so in order to have an accurate statistical analysis, the cluster 
data needed to match up with all the other data. 
Figure 2 
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C. Patent Data 
The patent data for this thesis were the least troublesome to obtain, although there 
were a few things that needed attention in order to ensure consistent results. The data 
were gathered from the US Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO), which stores every 
domestic registered patent since 1968. Again, in order to ensure that the industries lined 
up correctly the exact NCAIS code that was used for spending was used to find the 
industry for this data set. The only issue with the industry summation data set was that it 
only went up to 2012, but the individual technology patent data went up to 2015. 
Therefore, a manual summation of all groups of technologies within a particular industry 
was conducted for 2013, 2014, and 2015. This yielded an accurate estimate of the number 
of new patent registrations an industry had in those years. The unit of measurement used 
for patents in this thesis is simply the number of new patent registrations in a year. 
D. Control Variables 
The research and development variable data were gathered from the OECD, and 
was measured in millions of dollars just like the DOD spending variable. In this case, the 
entire data set needed to be limited because of the fact that the R&D data only went up to 
2013. After extensive research to find any industry level R&D data for the 2014-15 years, 
the results were unsuccessful, and therefore the 2014-2015 years needed to be omitted 
from the sample. However, the addition of a new cross section for the regression 
ultimately outweighs the loss of the two years. Although the two lost years removed 
some observations, a similar amount were added back on due to the fact that there was 
R&D data for three separate industries.  
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 The value added data were gathered from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA), and was also measured in millions of dollars. The range of this data is from 2007 
to 2013 and also is across the three core industries of analysis. One small hiccup arose, 
but it was corrected during the data collection process. In the BEA database, there were 
two separate categories for ICT, one for “manufacture of computer, electronic, and 
optical parts,” and another for “information and communication.” To address this, the 
sum of these two value added categories were taken to account for the entire size (in 
value added) of the ICT sector. 
E. Empirical Analysis 
The following section will exhibit the setup, execution, and analysis of the empirical 
data for this thesis. The program used for the statistical analysis was Eviews 8, and all 
data were imported from Microsoft Excel. There were 21 observations in the sample (7 
years X 3 industries = 21 observations) for each variable. A complete breakdown of the 
Eviews name for each variable is viewable in Appendix 1: Figure 4. In this analysis, there 
were a total of five regressions run, each offering a different approach to understanding 
the results of this new model. In order to account for multicolinearity, a correlation 
matrix was also run. There is also extensive analysis of scatter graphs, which actually can 
say a lot about the relationship between the variables.  
 The first step before analyzing the data is to generate a correlation matrix, and 
although the results weren’t perfect, many of the variables did not exhibit 
multicolinearity. As seen below in Figure 3, R&D was highly correlated with value added 
and moderately correlated with cluster 
specialization, and value 
Figure	3	
	 41	
added was correlated with cluster specialization. Despite these few hiccups, the rest of 
the variables were normal, and much of the multicolinearity problem was taken care of 
during the regressions.  
 Even from the initial graphic analysis, some interesting patterns begin to emerge 
about the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. For example, 
one key result is seen from the suggestion of a possible positive trend between DOD 
expenditure and patents. As seen below in figure 4, there is an upward trend; the more the 
DOD spends, the more patents we see registered (when excluding Aerospace). However, 
there is a very interesting discovery from this graph, which is the clear difference in gains 
from investment between industries. There are clearly 
three distinct patterns that emerge from 
this information, and because each industry 
has a differing relationship between DOD 
spending and patents. The obvious 
example in this graph is the aerospace 
industry. Unlike in the pharmaceutical and 
ICT industries, there appears to be a flat 
trend between DOD spending and patent 
registration. This phenomenon, however, is likely due to the fact that in the Aerospace 
industry, funding is almost exclusively done through very long-term contractual 
agreements. This means that the potential innovation gains from government investment 
would not be seen for a number of years, and thus could not be reflected in the short 
seven-year sample from this data set.  It is also important to note that this thesis is not 
Figure	4	
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necessarily asserting that there is a causal relationship between these variables, but rather 
there is a possible correlation. In addition, there are likely other variables that are 
influencing patents that this graph does not capture, so while there is important 
information to be gained from this, it is far from perfect. The disparities between 
particular industries can be seen in other variables as well such as cluster specialization, 
value added, and R&D. Other graphs exhibiting this phenomenon can be seen in 
Appendix 1: Figures 2 and 3. 
F. Regression Results 
On this page and the next are the results of each of three core regressions ran during 
this thesis. Each will be detailed separately to discuss the rationale, results, and changes 
made between regressions.  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Patents Regression 1 
Value Added 0.007 
(1.69)* 












a. Regression 1 
The first regression was the obvious initial step after formulating the initial 
model. In this regression, all of the core variables are regressed with all industries used. 
In addition, as stated in the model, Patents, a measure of innovation, are used as the 
dependent variable. However, even after attempting to modify the regression with time 
and cross sectional fixed effects, the results presented were the best available. There were 
issues with regression 1 in the value added, cluster specialization, and DOD spending 
variables. 
The issue with the value added variable is that, although it had the expected 
positive sign, it was only significant at the 20% level, which is a questionable measure of 
statistical significance. One of the most troubling issues is the fact that the cluster 
specialization sign was negative and significant. This is the exact opposite of what the 
Dependent Variable: 
Value Added 
Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Patents N/A -18.673 
(-2.57)*** 
N/A 
Cluster Spec N/A N/A N/A 




















N 12 10 10 
Year Fixed Effects   Yes t-stat in parentheses                                    Regressions 2-4 do not include Aerospace 
* p<.20 **p<.10 *** p<0.05                        See Regressions in Appendix 2  
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hypothesis predicted, and it would not be sensible to argue that as a cluster becomes more 
specialized that you see a decrease in innovation. This would fundamentally disagree 
with Porter et al’s research on clusters, and therefore it had to have been an issue with the 
regression. Another issue was that DOD spending was not statistically significant, even at 
the 20% level. After this regression, there needed to be a few significant tweaks to the 
data to get results that worked. 
b. Regression 2 
After comparing the results from regression 1 to some of the graphs (viewable in 
appendix 1), especially the Patent-DODspending graph seen in Figure 4, using aerospace 
as an industry no longer seemed practically viable in a regression. As previously 
discussed, the long contractual agreements of the aerospace industry make the data 
analysis nonviable. Also, if one views the cluster specialization-patent graph (Appendix 
1), the aerospace industry appears to have a negative trend, which could be contributing 
to the negative coefficient in the regressions. Therefore, that industry was removed. 
As the regression process went on, there was a shift in how this thesis measured 
the output of industrial policy. It became apparent that patents might not be the best 
measure of progress from investment due to the fact that they are simply a number rather 
than a monetary amount. The issue with this, as we see throughout the graphs detailed in 
Appendix 1, is that different industries have widely varying levels of patent output. For 
example, the ICT industry sees tens of thousands of new patents per year, whereas the 
Aerospace industry might only see a few hundred (but, Aerospace patents could be 
“worth” more in dollar terms, thus adding further confusion). However, if one uses value 
	 45	
added as the primary left side variable, then the direct growth in that particular industry 
as a result of changes in cluster specialization and DOD spending can be measured. 
 As we see in Chapter 2, Porter et al. explains that the greater the cluster 
specialization, the stronger the external economies should be. However, combined with 
the new information that perhaps it matters which industry the government chooses, it 
could be that DOD spending is actually impacted by how strong cluster specialization is. 
For example, the amount of value added gained from a particular DOD investment would 
actually be contingent on the specialization level of a given cluster. This led to another 
change for regression 2, in that it includes an interaction term to capture this 
“DODspend*clusterspec”.  This concept is not new, since it is truly the essence of what 
industrial policy is. When a government is trying to figure out where to spend their 
money, they have to decide what industry to spend it on. Krugman (1983) emphasizes 
this idea by stating that an explicit industrial policy “may include general incentives for 
capital formation, R&D, retraining of labor, and so on, but it will also almost surely 
involve  ‘targeting’ of industries thought to be of particular importance.” In addition, 
there was evidence of serial correlation in regression 2, so the AR(1) term was included 
to take care of that problem (spreads out the error terms to avoid this). 
 In regression 2, interaction term is positive, R&D is positive and significant at the 
5% level, and the AR(1) variable is positive and significant even at the 1% level. 
However, this regression results are far from perfect given that the interaction variable 
only had a P value of 0.178, but the interaction term’s p value was improved in 
subsequent regressions. Using the data from Regression 2, a real world example is 




δ(Value Added)/δ(DODspend) = 238.99 (Cluster Spec) 
Then use the median cluster spec data point for each industry (Location Quotient) . 
Biopharmaà238.99(0.446) = $106.58 Million of Value Added 
ICTà 238.99(0.458) = $109.45 Million of Value Added 
In the Biopharmaceutical industry, for example, a $1 million increase in DOD 
spending should result in a $106.58 million increase in value added. However, if the 
cluster specialization number were higher, we would expect to see an even greater gain in 
value added as a result of a $1 million increase in DOD spending. 
c. Regression 3 
As with the second regression, the final, and most promising regression excluded 
the Aerospace industry due to the fact that it did not fit with the model. In addition, the 
interaction term was kept as well because of the promising results from regression 2. For 
both regressions 3 and 4, the primary goal was to make the interaction term significant, 
but both have tradeoffs.  
The primary change in regression three was changing AR(1) to AR(2), and 
essentially this means that the serial correlation corrects for two years prior instead of 
one.  Another change was the inclusion of patents to test if increased levels of patents had 
any impact on value added. The hypothesis was that the greater patents/innovation in a 
sector, the greater the value added. The results of this regression were even more 
promising, but with a few issues. In this regression, every single one of the core variables 
(patents, the interaction term, R&D, and AR(2)) were significant at the 5% level. This 
Figure	5	
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was a very promising result, however the only problem was that the patent variable was 
negative, which was not the anticipated sign.  
d. Regression 4 
The final regression attempted to maintain the strong significance of all the 
variables while also getting rid of the patent variable since it had the wrong sign in 
regression 3. This regression was essentially the same as regression three, and as a result 
there were similarly strong results, with one exception. In this case, the AR(2) variable 
was only significant at the 20% variable. However, given the shortage of data, 
regressions three and four are likely the one of the best ways to estimate the effect of an 
explicit U.S cluster-based industrial policy without the actual policy being put into 
practice. 
G. Implications  
There are a lot of promising results from the statistical analysis, and it provides a 
strong case for a cluster based U.S industrial policy. As seen from the graphing data, 
there is clearly a relationship between the specialization levels of a cluster and its output 
in terms of value added or innovation. The same goes for governmental investment; there 
is a positive and significant relationship between DOD spending and positive output in 
terms of innovation and value added. However, a key revelation from this data is the need 
for an interaction term when conducting research. The decision of what clusters to invest 
in does matter for government. With this in mind, there are fundamental problems with 
the data, most significantly that there is a real shortage of both spending data and R&D 
data. For example, the DOD spending data gathered from the USA Spending database 
only provides data dating back to 2007. This is an issue that likely will be solved with 
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time, because more and more data will become available, however for this thesis it likely 
contributed to a lot of the practical problems in the regression analysis.  
Porter’s (2012) hypothesis that clusters appear to have a positive relationship with 
innovation and investment appears to be confirmed by these results, and they suggest that 
there are real benefits to an explicit industrial policy. The explicit industrial policy was 
something proposed by scholars such as Montero (2001) in the form of “horizontal 
embeddedness” and this thesis confirms the value of a more direct approach to industrial 
policy. As these results suggest, even a small investment can lead to huge gains in value 
added (contingent on the specialization levels of the cluster). Therefore, the results of the 


















 In 1983 Krugman argued that “At some point in the next decade, the U.S. will 
probably adopt an explicit industrial policy,” (Krugman, 1983) and yet, this prediction 
has yet to come to fruition over 30 years later. However, it is true that the current U.S. 
form of industrial policy through DOD spillovers is likely not capitalizing on the 
potential gains that would come from a more explicit program. This thesis set out to 
propose a new form of explicit, cluster-based industrial policy specifically tailored to the 
United States, and by using such a program, the United States could potentially see 
significant gains in employment, income inequality, innovation, and industrial growth. 
 The previous literature from scholars such as Porter (2012), Montero (2001), and 
Wade (2016) has laid the groundwork for this proposal, and their contributions have 
strong ties throughout this thesis. Porter in particular had derived the idea of clusters as 
an economic area (EA) that takes advantage of external economies. His work noted the 
substantial gains to employment, innovation, and growth within stronger clusters, and 
that is the basis for targeting clusters in this industrial policy proposal.  
 This thesis derived a model for this industrial policy proposal to statistically 
measure the impact of such a policy if it were used in the United States. To do this, a 
model that uses DOD expenditure, a measure of cluster specialization (how strong a 
cluster is), patent data, value added, and R&D was used. In addition, the data used were 
panel data, meaning that the data ranged from a period of 7 years (2007-2013) across 
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three carefully chosen industries. These industries were chosen in an effort to accurately 
depict distinct areas of U.S trade as it exists today. The graphic analysis revealed some 
interesting patterns that suggested a positive relationship between DOD expenditure, 
cluster specialization, value added, and R&D with patents. However, it became clear that 
patents was not a viable measure of industrial policy output for regression analysis due to 
the fact that the units were in real numbers but every other variable was in dollars. This, 
and the fact that each industry (especially the Aerospace industry) was so different, made 
it difficult to use patents as the dependent variable in the regression. However, when 
excluding the Aerospace industry, using value added as the dependent variable, and an 
interaction term (between cluster specialization and DOD spending) there were positive 
and significant results.  
B. Recommendations for Future Research 
 The results gained from this thesis are promising, but also confirm the necessity 
of greater research into this particular policy proposal. In particular, the results from the 
regression analysis were encouraging, but there were a few notable issues, primarily with 
the lack of data available at the time of writing this thesis. However, this opens the door 
for promising future research. For some regressions, there were only 10 observations 
available, but this is simply because of the lack of both DOD spending data and value 
added data. The DOD spending data only dates back to 2007, so there will need to be 
further research done on this particular policy when more data inevitably becomes 
available. In addition, future research should potentially focus on finding a new set of 
industries to examine, because perhaps those will yield differing/stronger results. If in the 
future, a form of explicit industrial policy is incorporated into the United States trade 
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strategy, then at this point there could be some interesting research done on its real world 
impact. However, the policy that has been put forth in this thesis is primarily meant to be 
a starting point, a first step in the direction of making truly explicit industrial policy a 
reality in the United States. There are clusters that are ripe for U.S industrial policy 
intervention, and if they are capitalized on, then there could be substantial gains for the 
U.S. If future researchers are able to expand on the work of this thesis, or even derive a 
new proposal as a result of this work, then perhaps an explicit industrial policy in the 



















































Eviews Variable Name Definition 
CLUSTERSPEC Measure of cluster specialization using the 
location quotient. The higher this number, 
the greater the cluster specialization. 
DODSPEND Measure of expenditure by year from the 
DOD in a given sector. Units: millions of 
dollars 
DODSPEND*CLUSTERSPEC Interaction term between cluster 
specialization and DOD spending. Change 
in dependent variable is contingent on 
specialization level of cluster. 
R_D Measure of research and development in a 
given industry. Units: millions of dollars. 
VALUE_ADDED Measure of value added in a given industry 
in millions of dollars (size of industry). 
PATENTS Measure of innovation by taking # of new 
patent registrations in a given year (by 
industry) 
AR(1)/AR(2) Eviews tool to correct serial error 
correlation. Creates a lag for the error terms 
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